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(ABSTRACT) 
Telecommunications policymakers and comm-
entators have long debated whether regulators 
should mandate access to existing facilities or 
instead promote incentives to invest in new 
network capacity by denying such access. After 
reviewing the history of mandating access to local 
telephone networks and last-mile broadband 
networks in the United States, this article reviews 
how mandating access to existing facilities 
necessarily embroils regulators with the troublesome 
problems associated with rate regulation, prevents 
firms from realizing the efficiencies associated with 
vertical integration, and impedes the emergence of 
competition by dampening both incumbents' and 
new entrants' incentives to make new investments 
7 
in alternative network capacity. Empirical 
scholarship studying this issue also largely 
supports focusing on stimulating facilities-based 
competition instead of relying on access regulation 
to mandate sharing of the monopoly loop. 
Key words: telecommunications, broadband, 
rate regulation, vertical integration, investment 
incentives 
I. Introduction 
The United States has long been a pioneer in 
telecommunications policy, often mandating that 
incumbents provide others with access to their 
networks. Indeed, this approach provided the 
foW1dation for both the breakup of AT & T and the 
implementation of the Telecorrumrr:rications Act of 
t !f-.:il~J:f 2010. 11. 27, {o!Af~J:f 2010. 4. 25, 7JIAH~~~J:f 
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1996. Over the past decade, however, the advent 
of competition has allowed the U.S. to eliminate 
most of these access requirements. The U.S. is 
cWTently evaluating whether it should reverse 
course and begin imposing access requirements 
on broadband. The debate over whether to 
reintroduce access requirements has turned into 
the key controversy in U.S. telecommunications 
policy for the past five years and determined the 
fate of major reform legislation. It emerged as an 
issue in the last presidential campaign, with 
President Obama offering his endorsement for 
mandating access to broadband networks. 
1) The seminal decision is Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 
982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For an overview and critique of the 
doctrine, see Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo. 
Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden 
Side of Trinka, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1826-64 (2007). 
2) See United States v. AT&T Corp., 524 F. Supp.1336, 1352-53, 
1360-61 (D.D.C. 1981). 
3) See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,388 (1999) 
(holding that the unbundled access provisions of the Teleco-
mmunications Act of 1996 requires that the FCC consider 
whether the party requesting access can self-provision the 
network elements and whether the network elements are 
available from another source); id. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) ("(A]Ithough the provision 
describing which elements must be unbundled does not explicitly 
refer to the analogous 'essential facilities' doctrine (an antitrust 
doctrine that this Court has never adopted), the Act, in my view, 
does impose related limits upon the FCC's power to compel 
unbundling.") . 
4) PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, ~I 771a, at 192-94 (3d ed., 2008); Bruce M. Owen, 
Determining Optimal Access to Regulated Essential Facilities, 
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 887, 887-89 (1989); Gregory J. Werden, 
The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 462 (1987). 
5) See United States v. AT&T, 524 U.S. at 1373-74; Amendment 
of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations 
(Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 
461 ~I ~I 202-203 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final 
Decision]; LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 165-
66 (2001); Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate: A User's Guide, 3 
J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 84-85 (2004). 
6) See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified 
Theory of Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 43, 46-57 (2008). 
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The time is thus ripe to reconsider the the-
oretical and empirical support for mandating 
access. Compelling access to a bottleneck facility 
to promote competition in complementary services 
is generally regarded as being based on what 
lower courts have called the "essential facility 
doctrine." ll Indeed, the doctrine formed the e"A'Plicit 
basis for the breakup of AT&T.21 Although access 
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 did not explicitly adopt the essential facilities 
doctrine as its standard, it incorporated similar 
principles and thus was subject to the similar 
limitations.3l Leading commentators have noted 
that the doctrine' s central concern is about vertical 
integration, specifically that an enterprise that 
controls a monopoly input may be able to harm a 
vertically related market by refusing to share it.4l 
Indeed, courts and agencies ordering access to 
local telephone systems and commentators calling 
for access to last-mile broadband facilities 
acknowledge that their claims are fundamentally 
complaints about vertical integration. 51 
The essential facility doctrine has been subject 
to extensive and trenchant critique. Not only does 
the doctrine require regulation of rates. It also has 
the unfortunate effect of discouraging investment 
in alternative network capacity and of preventing 
the realization of the benefits of vertical 
integration. Indeed, if applied to situations in which 
entry by firms competing directly with the mono-
poly facility is possible, it can have the perverse 
effect of locking the network into place. 
II. U.S. Regulatory History 
The U.S. has a long history of mandating 
access to both local telephone networks6l and to 
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local broadband networks?l In recent years, the 
advent of competition has led policymakers to lift 
most of the access requirements. 
1. Access to Local Telephone 
Networks 
'Throughout the early years of the telephone 
industry, the entire system was generally 
regarded as a single , fully integrated, natural 
monopoly. 8 l During the 1960s, however , 
policymakers began to question this premise. 
Although the local telephone service (also 
sometimes called last mile service) remained 
characterized by the high fixed costs associated 
with natural monopoly,9l policymakers began to 
recognize that certain complementary services-
such as long distance service, customer premises 
equipment (CPE), and innovative, new services 
that combined data processing with traditional 
transmission services (which were initially called 
enhanced service and would eventually become 
known as information services) -could be 
competitively provided. 1m Concerns remained that 
local telephone providers could use their control 
over the local loop to harm competition in markets 
for these complementary services. One concern 
was that local telephone companies could use 
supracompetitive returns earned in local 
telephone markets to cross subsidize their own 
proprietary complementary service offerings. 
Another was that local telephone companies 
would use exclusivity or tying arrangements to 
lock out competitive providers of those services. 
Yet another was the worry that companies would 
avoid rate regulation of local telephone services 
by bundling them wid1 an unregulated service and 
charging excessive prices for the unregulated 
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s ervice that allowed the m to earn the 
supracompetitive returns denied them by rate 
regulation of local services.]]) 
The classic solution has been to structurally 
separate those portions of the telephone system 
that still exhibited natural monopoly characteristics 
from those that are potentially competitive and to 
require that the monopolist provide equal access 
to all providers of complementary services. 
Requiring that potentially competitive and 
inherently monopolistic lines of business be 
structurally separated into distinct corporate 
entities made it more difficult for enterprises to 
use profits from their monopoly businesses to 
cross subsidize business units that faced 
competition. Structural separation also made 
discrimination against unaffiliated providers of 
complementary service s eas ier to police. 
7) Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband 
Internet Access, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 6-19 (2008). 
8) See, e.g., GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
IN TURMOIL 107 (1987) (Indeed, un til the late 1960s few 
questioned that the telephone industry was a natural mono-
poly."); PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS LAW §?2.1.2, at 86 (2d ed., 1999) ("Is the 
telephone industry (or any part of 11) a natural monopoly? Until 
the 1960s, the answer was generally presumed to be yes, from 
end to end. ") ; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 
4, ~I 787c, at 366 (3d ed., 2008) ("Until the 1960s or 1970s 
long d istance telephone connections b e tween local 
exchanges in the United States were considered as much a 
natural monopoly as the local exchanges themselves .... "). 
9) See, e.g., ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 127 (1971) 
("That the provision of local telephone service is a natural 
monopoly is generally conceded."); STEPHEN G. BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 291 (1982) ("Local telephone 
service seems to be generally accepted as a natural monopoly."). 
10) See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T 
and the Changing World of Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. 
ON REG. 517, 520-29 (1988). 
11) See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen , The Anticompetitive 
Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST 
REVOLUTION 328, 339-50 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. 
White eds., 2d ed., 1994). 
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Regulators could simply insist that local telephone 
companies offer to competitors the same terms of 
interconnection that it provided to its own affiliated 
complementary services. If properly implemented, 
this approach would allow conswners to enjoy the 
benefits of relying on competition instead of direct 
governmental intervention to discipline industry 
actors 12l while still protecting conswners against 
potential anticompetitive abuses in those portions 
of the industry that remained uncompetitive. 
This rationale animated many of the major 
regulatory initiatives undertaken by the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC). For example, 
in 1968, the FCC issued its landmark Carterfone 
decision that eventually led to the adoption of 
regulations requiring that AT&T open its network 
12) In the words of the FCC Chief Economist who oversaw 
implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
.. [T]elephone regulation ... has grown unwieldy, unmanageable, 
inefficient, and dysfunctional. It's time to find an alternative. 
Competition is the greatest technique ever invented to bring about 
innovation, low prices, choice, and efficiency. If we can efficiently 
create competition in this so-called natural monopoly, we' II have 
done a great thing ... Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 
49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 206 (1996). 
13) Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone 
Service, Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). 
14) The initial rules were based on a distinction between 
communications and data processing. See Regulatory and Policy 
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Services and Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 
F.C.C.2d 291 (1970). The FCC later based the rules on the 
distinction between basic and enhanced services. See Computer 
II Final Decision, supra note 5. See generally Robert Cannon, The 
Legacy of the Federal Communication Commission's Computer 
Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003). 
15) See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 186-91, 195-
97 (D. D.C. 1982), all' d mem. sub nom Maryland v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
16) See 47 U.S.C. §§271-275. 
17) 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3). 
18) ld., §251 (d)(2)(A) & (B) (emphasis added). 
1 9) Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 
F.C.C.R. 15499 (1 996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order]. 
20) Review of the Sec. 251 Unbundled Obligations of Incumbent 
Local Exch. Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand 
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to CPE manufactured by competitive providers,l3l 
The same considerations underlay the FCC' s 
Computer Inquiries, which required that large 
carriers who wished to offer enhanced services 
do so through a separate subsidiary while offering 
Lmaffiliated enhanced service providers nondis-
criminatory access to their transmission fac-
ilities.14l Most importantly, the court that ordered 
the brealmp of AT & T based its decision on the 
same justification when ordering the Bell System 
to spin off its local telephone operations into 
independent companies and forbidding these 
newly created local telephone companies from 
providing long distance, CPE, or information 
services.15l 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also 
contained provisions preventing the local 
telephone companies created by the breakup of 
AT&T from offering long distance, manufacturing 
CPE. or providing certain information services.16l 
The Act also required all incumbent local 
telephone companies to provide unbundled access 
to all of its network elements at any technically 
feasible point. 17l The unbundling requirement 
imposed by the 1996 Act did include one key 
limitation, however. It limited unbundled access to 
those elements that are "necessary" and the 
absence of which would "impair" the ability of the 
telecommunications carrier seeking access to 
provide the services that it seeks to offer.l8l 
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) initially applied unbundling to a wide range 
of elements associated with local telephone 
service.l9J In its landmark 2003 Triennial Review 
Order, the FCC declined to eliminate the unbundled 
access requirements on local telephone service, 
only to see that decision overturned on judicial 
review.20l 
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Over time, the emergence of competition has 
permitted U.S. policymakers to eliminate most of 
the remaining restrictions. For example, the 
statute lifted the restriction prohibiting local 
telephone providers that used to be part of AT & T 
from offering long distance service as soon as 
those local providers took sufficient steps to 
guarantee competition.2D By 2003, the FCC 
approved allowing all local telephone companies to 
offer in-region long distance service in every 
state except for Alaska and Hawaii.22l In 2007, 
the FCC abolished these restrictions altogether as 
long as the local telephone companies complied 
with other safeguards.23l 
Approval to sell long distance automatically 
lifted the restriction preventing these local 
telephone companies from manufacturing CP£.24) 
The FCC also eliminated the regulation prohibiting 
local telephone companies from bundling CPE25l 
and allowed the industry to take over setting the 
technical standards that CPE manufacturers had 
to meet in order to connect their devices to the 
network.20l The FCC subsequently eliminated tl1e 
access requirements for information services.27l 
2. Access to Local Broadband 
Networks 
The FCC has also imposed a wide range of 
access requirements on DSL networks. When the 
FCC first confronted DSL, the agency required 
that DSL services be governed by a tariff, which 
essentially subjected DSL to an access 
requirement.28l The FCC had to address precisely 
which network elements should be subject to the 
1996 Act' s UNE access requirements. Because 
the 1996 Act by its own terms applies only to 
elements used in telephone exchange service and 
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exchange access, the initial order implementing 
t11e statute declined to subject packet switches to 
UNE access requirements.29l The FCC also ruled 
that collocation did not extend to equipment used 
to provide only enhanced services. However, it 
did extend to equipment supporting both conven-
tional telephone and enhanced services if the 
equipment was necessary to provide conventional 
telephone service.30l The order did mandate UNE 
access to all loops connecting central offices to 
end users, including the loops used to provide 
DSL.3ll The order also obligated incumbent local 
telephone companies to fulfill any requests to 
condition existing loops to make them DSL 
compatible.32l A subsequent order confmned that 
collocation included multifunction equipment that 
could be used to provide both voice and data 
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 
16978, 17237-38 ~1419, 17239 ~1422, 17263-64 ~1459, 
17265-86 ~I ~1464-485(2003), modified, 18 F.C.C.R. 19020 
(2003), vacated in relevant part sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass'n 
v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
21) 47 U.S.C. §?271 (c). 
22) FCC, BOC Authorization to Provide In-Region, lnterLATA 
Services Under Sections 271 and 272 (Jan. 14, 201 0), 
http://www. fcc.gov/Bureaus/Com mon_Carrier/in -region 
_applications/. 
23) Section 272(1) (1) Sunset of the BOC Separate Affiliate and 
Related Requirements, Report and Order and Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 16440 (2007). 
24) 47 u.s. c. §273. 
25) Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, lnterexchange 
Marketplace, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7424 ~110, 
7436-40 ~I ~130-36 (2001 l. 
26) 2000 Biennial Reg. Review of Part 68 of the Commission's 
Rules and Regulations, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 24944, 
~I ~I 16-17, 24951-53 ~I ~I 20-23 (2000). 
27) Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet 
Over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14875-98 ~I ~I 
41-85 (2005). 
28) GTE Telephone Operating Cos., Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 22466 (1998). 
29) Local Competition Order, supra note 19, at 15713 ~1427. 
30) /d., at 15794-95 ~I ~1580-581. 
31) /d., at 15691-92 ~I ~1380-382. 
32) /d. 
~AiiT/-Ail£1 ~ Ail4"[:! Ail1.2. 2011. 5. 
services.33l Perhaps most importantly, the FCC' s 
Line Sharing Order mandated UNE access to the 
high frequency portion of the loop used to carry 
DSL so that two competitors could provide 
services over the same loop, with one offering 
conventional telephone service in the lower 
frequencies and the other offering DSL in the 
upper frequencies.3"1l 
The courts soon began to question the breadth 
of the FCC' s rulings, beginning with the Supreme 
Court' s decision in AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities 
Board, which remanded the FCC' s initial UNE 
access rules for construing the "necessary" and 
"impair" standards too broadly.35l On remand. the 
FCC reiterated that incumbent local telephone 
companies must condition DSL loops upon 
request.:lol Although UNE access to loops 
generally included all attached electronics, the 
33) See Deploymen t of Wiretine Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability. First Report and Order and 
Further Notice ol Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761 , 
4776-79 ~I ~127-31 (1999). 
34) See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Third Report and Order in CC 
Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth Report and Order in CC 
Docket No. 96-98,14 F.C.C.R. 20912 (1999). 
35) 525 u.s. 366,387-92 (1999). 
36) Implementation ol the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act ol 1996, Third Report and Order and 
Fourth Further Notice ol Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 
3696, 3772-73 ~1 1 67 (1999). 
37) /d. at 3776-77 ~1 175, 3783-84 ~I ~1190-194. 
38) ld. at 3835- 37 ~I ~1306-309. 
39) /d. at 3839-40 ~I ~1 314 -317. 
40) GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422-24 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §251 (c)(6) (2000)). 
41) Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and Order, 16 
F.C.C.R. 15435, 15452-60 ~I ~132-44 (2001 ). 
42) Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2002) . 
43) U.S. TelecomAss'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
44) /d. at415, 428-29. 
45) Review of the Sec tion 251 Unbundling Obligations of 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and 
Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
18 F.C.C.R. 16978, 17327-33 ~I ~1549-580 (2003). 
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FCC specifically exempted pad<et switches and 
DSLAMs on the grounds that the incumbents did 
not maintain a monopoly position with respect to 
these functions.37l Granting UNE access to them 
would deter investment in a nascent market.38l 
The FCC did permit UNE access to DSLAMs 
located in remote terminals that were too small to 
pennit physical collocation.39l 
In 2000, the D.C. Circuit strud< down the FCC's 
decision pennitting the collocation of multifunction 
equipment as a violation of the statutory provision 
authorizing collocation only if "necessary for 
interconnection or access to unbundled network 
elements." 40l In response, the FCC revised its 
rules in 2001 to limit collocation of multifunction 
equipment to equipment whose primary purpose 
is to provide the requesting carrier either with 
interconnection that is "equal in quality" to that 
provided by the incumbent local telephone 
company for its own services or with "nondis-
criminatory access" to an unbundled network 
element.~' > These revisions to the collocation 
rules were sufficient to survive judicial scrutiny.42l 
In the meantime, the D.C. Circuit further has-
tened the deregulation of DSL by striking dmvn 
the FCC's decision requiring line sharing.~ 3l The 
court reasoned that the FCC' s findings that DSL 
faced robust competition from cable modem 
providers meant that line sharing violated the 
"necessary" and "impair" requirements of the 
1996 Act.-14l On remand, the FCC eliminated line 
sharing and lifted the UNE access obligations to 
most high-capacity loops in its landmark 2003 
Triennial Review Order, which also eliminated the 
limited exceptions it had recognized for UNE 
access to DSLAMs and other packet switching 
equipment.45l Although the D.C. Circuit invalidated 
portions of the Triennial Re11iew Order that 
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addressed local telephone service, it explicitly 
affrrmed the parts of the FCC' s decision dealing 
with broadband.46> The FCC also detariffed DSL 
services that SBC Communications offered 
through its separate subsidiary:17l The FCC did 
intervene, however, when a small rural local 
telephone company known as Madison River 
Communications attempted to preserve its local 
telephone revenues by preventing its DSL 
customers from accessing the ports needed to 
utilize Internet telephony.48l 
The FCC was considerably more tentative in 
its regulatory approach to cable modem service. 
On multiple different occasions between 1998 and 
2002, the FCC declined to decide which regulatory 
classification should apply to cable modem service, 
let alone decide the scope of any access obligations 
that might apply.~ 9> This reluctance to do so drew 
rebuke from two members of the Supreme 
Court.50l Because cable modems arose from a 
technology subject to joint municipal-federal 
oversight, some ambiguity existed as to the 
proper division of regulatory jurisdiction. In the 
absence of a clear assertion of federal authority, 
several mmricipal regulators attempted to exer-
cise jurisdiction over cable modem systems, by 
mandating access to those systems either through 
municipal orclinance51 > or as a condition for the 
transfer of licenses needed to complete a cable 
merger.52> Municipal regulation was soon cut 
short by a series of judicial decisions holding that 
municipal authorities lacked the jurisdiction to 
compel multiple ISP access.53> 
The FCC' s role in providing regulatory 
approval for cable mergers also forced it to 
confront requests for mandatory access to cable 
modem systems. In 1999 and 2000, the FCC 
declined to require AT&T to provide independent 
13 
ISPs with nondiscriminatory access to its cable 
modem systems as a condition of its acqtlisitions 
of TCI and Media0ne.54> In the midst of these 
merger reviews, the FCC initiated a notice of 
inquiry seeking comment on whether it should 
impose access requirements on cable modem 
systems.55> In 2000, however, the Federal Trade 
Commission imposed (and the FCC later in1p!e-
46) U.S. Telecom Ass' n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 578-85 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). 
47) Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEG 
Broadband Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 
F .C.C.R. 27000 (2002). 
48) Madison River Communications LLC and Affiliated Com-
panies, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005). 
49) See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of 
Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, 
Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9872 ~1126 (2000); 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over 
Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F .C.C.R. 19287, 
19293-28 ~I ~115-24 (2000); Federal-State Joint Board on 
Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501 , 
11535 n.140 (1998) ; Implementation of Section 703(e) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6795 ~134 
(1998); Brief for the Fed. Petitioners at 30, Nat'/ Cable & 
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (No. 
00-843), 2001 WL 34136726; Amicus Curiae Brief of the FCC at 
15-16, 18, MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 
F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1680(L)), 2000 WL 
33991834: Brief of the FCC as Amicus Curiae at 19-26, AT&T 
Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-
35609), 1999 WL 33631595; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15 
n.4 , Gulf Power, 534 U.S. 327 (No. 00-843) , 2000 WL 
34015593. 
50) See Gulf Power, 534 U.S. at 353-56 (Thomas, J., joined by 
Souter, J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
51) See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward 
County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 686-87 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
52) See MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 360: Portland, 216 F.3d at 875. 
53) See MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 363-64; Portland, 216 F.3d at 
878-79. 
54) See AT&T -MediaOne Order, supra note 49, at 9872-73 ~I 
127; Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of 
Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Comm-
unications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee , 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3205-08 
~I ~192-96 (1999). 
55) Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over 
Cable and Other Facili ties, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 
19287 (2000). 
~Xi]:rfXiJ£1 tg;j Xi[4-[:l XiJ1.2. 2011. 5. 
mented) just such a requirement when approving 
America Online's acquisition of Time Wamer.56J 
When the issue arose again in 2002 during 
regulatory clearance of Comcast' s acquisition of 
AT & T' s cable assets, the FCC returned to its 
initial position and declined to make its approval of 
the merger conditional on the company's 
willingness to provide multiple ISP access.57l The 
net result was that, unlike DSL, cable modem 
services remained largely free of access 
requirements with the exception of AOL Time 
Warner. 
The regulatory regime governing broadband 
fmally began to take shape in 2002, when the FCC 
issued its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling 
determining that cable modem service is an 
interstate "information service" exempt from both 
the common carriage regime established under 
Title II to govern telecommunications services 
and from the regulatory regime established by 
56) Am. Online, Inc., Decision & Order, No. C-3989, slip op. at 2, 
6-9, 11-17 (Fed. Trade Comm' n Dec. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf; Applications for 
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 
214 Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, 
Inc., Transferors, to AOL Tirne Warner Inc., Transferee, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6568-69 
~I ~157-58 (2001). 
57) Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses 
from Comcast Corporation and AT&T Corp., Transferors, to 
AT&T Corncast Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
17 F.C.C.R. 23246,23299-301 ~I ~1135-137 (2002). 
58) Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over 
Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4820-39 ~I ~134-
69 (2002). 
59) /d. at 4825 ~143-44. 
60) /d. at 4840-41. 
61) 545 U.S. 967,1001-02 (2005). 
62) Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet 
over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulernaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14862-65 ~I ~I 
12-17 (2005), petition for review denied sub nom. Time 
Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Title VI to govern cable television services.ss) In 
addition, the FCC declined to impose the tariffing 
and unbundling requirements created by the 
Computer Inquiries to cable modem service, 
noting that the agency previously "has applied 
these obligations only to traditional wireline 
services and facilities, and has never applied them 
to information services provided over cable 
facilities." 50l Declaring that cable modem systems 
constituted information services did not resolve 
exactly how FCC would regulate cable modem 
systems. On the contrary, the FCC specifically 
sought comment on what, if any, access require-
ments it should impose on cable modem 
service.60l 
The FCC' s Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling 
touched off a three-year court battle over its 
validity that would ultimately be resolved by the 
Supreme Court. Finally, the Supreme Court' s 2005 
decision in National Cable & TelecommLIJJications 
Ass' n v. Brand X Internet Services sustained the 
FCC' s Cable Modem Declaratory RLiling concluding 
that cable modem service was an "information 
service" that was not subject to the access requi-
rements imposed on telecommunications ser-
vices.6ll 
Shortly thereafter, the FCC issued its Wireline 
Broadband Order, which ruled that DSL and other 
broadband services provided by local telephone 
companies also constituted information services 
that were not subject to Title II' s common carri-
age and tariffing requirements.62l In addition, the 
order eliminated the Computer Inquiry rules with 
respect to all broadband technologies used to 
provide Internet service. This ruling did not e:>..i:end 
the requirements to broadband technologies used 
to provide traditional telephone service, such as 
frame relay services, stand-alone asynchronous 
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transfer mode ("ATM") services, and gigabit 
Ethernet services. 63 l The FCC also found 
insufficient evidence to justify mandating 
nondiscriminatory access to content and appli-
cation providers, while reserving the right to 
change its mind should circumstances warrant.64 l 
At the same time, the FCC issued a Policy 
Statement recognizing its intention to preserve 
consumers' rights to access content, run appli-
cations, and attach devices as they see fit, subject 
to the needs of law enforcement, protection aga-
inst harm to the network, and reasonable network 
management.65l Two years later, the Wireline 
Broadband Order was sustained on judicial 
review.66l 
Since the Wireline Broadband Order, the FCC 
has taken additional steps to deregulate broadband 
services provided by local telephone companies. 
For example, the FCC has granted waivers giving 
Verizon, AT&T, and Qwest pricing flexibility for 
certain business-oriented broadband technologies 
that were previously subject to price cap regu-
lation.67l Most importantly, the FCC has granted 
63) /d. at 14860-61 ,19 & n.15, 14875-79 ,141-46 & n.107, 
14804-98 ,I ,177-85. 
64) /d. at 14904 ,I 96. 
65) Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F .C.C.R. 14986 (2005). 
66) Time Warner, 507 F.3d at 205. 
67) Petition for Waiver of Pricing Flexibility Rules for Fast Packet 
Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 16840 
(2005); SBC Communications Inc. Petition for Wavier of 
Section 61.42 of the Commission's Rules, Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 
7224 (2007); Qwest Petition for Waiver of Pricing Flexibility 
Rules for Advanced Communications Networks Services, 
Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 7482 (2007). 
68) Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. §160(c) 
from Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its 
Broadband Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 
F .C.C.R. 18705, 18718-19 ,122, 18723-24 ,130 (2007); 
Press Release, FCC, Verizon Tel. Cos.' Petition for 
Forbearance from Title II & Computer Inquiry Rules with 
Respect to Their Broadband Services Is Granted by Operation 
of Law (Mar. 20, 2006), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
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waivers to both Verizon and AT & T deregulating 
the broadband services still subject to the 
Computer Inquiry rules following the Wireline 
Broadband Order on the grounds that wireline 
broadband services face enough competition from 
other providers to justify foregoing retail access 
requirements.68l The net result is to eliminate the 
remaining retail access requirements on 
broadband services provided by local telephone 
companies. 
The FCC' s orders clearing a number of recent 
mergers reaffitmed its decision not to give content 
and application providers nondiscriminatory access 
to last-mile broadband networks. The orders 
concluded that competition was sufficiently robust 
to prevent network providers from discriminating 
against any particular content or applications and 
pointed to the lack of evidence in the record that 
any network provider had engaged in such 
practices.69 l The FCC has also issued rulings 
declaring that broadband over power line and 
wireless broadband constitute information 
services.70l In March 2007, the FCC issued a 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-264436A 1.pdf. 
69) AT&T Inc. and BeiiSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of 
Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R . 5662, 
5727-31 ,I ,1116-120, 5742-46 ,I ,1151-153 (2007); 
Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of 
Control of Licenses: Adelphia Commc' ns Corp., Assignors, to 
Time Warner Cable Inc., Assignees, Applications for Consent to 
the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses: 
Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, 
debtors-in-possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. 
(subsidiaries), Assignees et at., Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203, 8296-99 ,I ,1217-223 (2006); 
Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for 
Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 18507-09 ,I ,1139-142 (2005); 
SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for 
Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 20F.C.C.R.18290, 18365-68 ,I ,1140-143 (2005). 
70) United Power Line Council' s Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line 
Internet Access Serv1ce as an Information Service, 
notice of inquiry seeking specific examples of 
network providers disfavoring particular content 
and seeking comment on the impact of any such 
behavior on conswners.71l Most recently, the FCC 
ruled that Comcast' s network management 
policies with respect to BitTorrent violated the 
Policy Statement issued by the Commission in 
2005 only to see that decision overturned by the 
courts.72l 
The FCC has continued to weigh whether it 
should adopt network neutrality rules mandating 
that broadband network providers give nondi-
scriminatory access to all content and application 
providers.73l In the aftermath of the BitTorrent 
decision, the FCC flirted with reversing its 
longstanding decisions that broadband is not a 
telecommtmications service subject to the com-
mon caniage obligations created by Title II of the 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13281 (2006); 
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the 
Internet over Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, 22 
F.C.C.R. 5901 (2007). 
71) Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 
7894 (2007). 
72) Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer 
Applications, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 
13,028 (2008), vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 
F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 201 0). 
73) See Preserving the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed 
Rule making, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064 (2009); Further Inquiry into 
Two Under-Developed Issues in the Open Internet 
Proceeding, Public Notice, 2010 WL 3445217 (F .C.C. Sept. 1, 
2010). 
74) See Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of 
Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 7866 (2010). 
75) Federal Commun ications Commission Chairman Julius 
Genachowski, Remarks on Preserving Internet Freedom and 
Openness 3 (Dec. 1, 201 0), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/DOC-303136A 1.pdf. 
76) Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 
17905 (201 0). 
77) See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 873 (2009); Thomas B. Nachbar, The 
Public Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67 (2008). 
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Communications Act of 1934,74l but ultimately 
decided against it.75l Finally, on December 21, 
2010, the FCC adopted its ()pen Internet Order, in 
which enacted rules requiring transparent 
disclosure of network management practices; 
prohibiting last-mile providers from blocking 
lawful content, applications, services, and 
nonharmful devices; and barring unreasonable 
discrimination in transmitting lawful network 
traffic. In so doing, the FCC created exceptions to 
these rules for reasonable network management 
and specialized services. It also required mobile 
broadband providers to comply with the 
transparency rule and prohibited them from 
blocking services that compete directly with their 
voice or video services. It declined to extend the 
prohibition of unreasonable discrimination to 
mobile broadband providers, opting instead to 
monitor the development of the mobile broadband 
marketplace and to defer any further adjustments 
to the regulatory framework until tl1ey are shown 
to be necessary_76J 
Ill. The Inevitability of Rate 
Regulation 
As leading antitrust commentators have 
pointed out, compelling access to an essential 
facility does not prevent the monopolist from 
harming competition. Although some have 
suggested that these problems can be avoided 
simply by imposing a nondiscrimination 
mandate,77> such a mandate would not prevent the 
monopolist from simply charging both its own 
affiliate and competitors interconnection fees that 
were prohibitively expensive. Doing so would not 
affect the its bottom line, since any losses 
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incurred by the complementary services division 
would be offset dollar-for-dollar by higher 
profits earned by its local telephone operations. It 
would, however, effectively lock out competitors. 
In the absence of some control of rates, com-
pelling access simply requires that the monopolist 
share the essential facility with its competitors 
without providing any benefits consumers_78l If 
rates are not regulated, the monopolist would be 
expected simply to share the facility with 
everyone willing to pay the monopoly price. 
Compelling access to a monopoly facility thus 
requires rate regulation in order to be effective. 
Such access will engender incessant complaints 
about the rate charged. As Professors Areeda and 
Hovenkamp have noted, once access is ordered, 
[t]he plaintiff is likely to claim that the 
defendant's price for access to an essential 
facility (1) is so high as to be the equivalent of 
a continued refusal to deal, or (2) is unreaso-
nable, or (3) creates a 'price squeeze' in that 
the defendant charges so much for access 
and so little for the product it sells in 
competition with the plaintiff that the latter 
cannot earn a reasonable profiJ.79l 
Policymal(ers have long struggled to develop a 
principled basis for evaluating the reasonableness 
of rates.80l Rate regulation has long raised difficult 
questions of valuation and allocation of joint costs. 
The classic ratemaking methodology also 
provides insufficient incentive to reduce costs and 
encourages firms to use capital costs over 
operating costs even when doing so is inefficient. 
Lastly, it subjects economic pricing to the delays 
and biases inherent in the regulatory process. The 
Supreme Court has thus recognized that deter-
mining what constitutes a reasonable rate has long 
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proven to be an "embarrassing question"81l as well 
as a "laborious and baffling task" 82l 
Moreover, disputes over the reasonableness 
of rates are especially difficult to resolve when the 
good subject to rate regulation varies in quality, as 
is the case with broadband, in which quality of 
service varies along as many as four dimen-
sions.83l When quality varies, the regulated firm 
can evade the effect of rate regulation simply by 
degrading quality.84l Indeed, this is just what 
happened in the case of attempts to subject the 
cable industry to rate regulation, in which regu-
lation actually caused quality-adjusted cable-rates 
to increase.85l It is further complicated when the 
interface through which the firms will interconnect 
is complex.86l As the Supreme Court has noted, 
78) AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ~1771 b, at 195: 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE 208 (1 976). 
79) AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ,l774e, at 276. 
80) For a concise overview of the problems associated with rate 
regulation, see NTIA Regulatory Alternatives Staff, NTIA 
Regulatory Alternatives Report 13-31 (NTIA Report 87-222, 
July 1987), http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/pub/ntia-rpt/87-
222/87-222.pdf. For other useful discussions, see, e.g., 
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
RATES 547-622 (2d ed. 1 988); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 27-54 (1971); id. at 47-94, 
345-47; W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 364-74 (3d ed. 2000); 
George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators 
Regulate?: The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962). 
81) Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898). 
82) Mo. ex rei. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm' n, 262 U.S. 
276, 292 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment). 
83) Broadband quality of service can vary in terms of bandwidth, 
delay, jitter, and reliability. See ANDREW TANENBAUM, 
COMPUTER NETWORKS §5.4 (4th ed., 2003). 
84) See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COM-
PETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 54-55 (2000). 
85) See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER , PUBLIC 
POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION (1997); Gregory S. 
Crawford, The Impact of the Household Demand and Welfare, 
31 RAND J. ECON. 422 (2000). 
86) See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The 
Telecommunications Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL' Y 
73, 81-82 (2003). 
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the complexity of the interfaces in telecommLmi-
cations networks gives network owners a nearly 
endless source of nonprice ways in which they 
can defeat access.87l 
As a result, the essential facility doctrine 
necessarily requires the government to oversee 
fairly comprehensive oversight over the entire 
business relationship. The difficulties the FCC 
confronted when attempting to implement other 
access regimes, such as long-distance 
interconnection.8m access to cable television 
systems,89l and the unbundled access require-
ments of the TelecommLmications Act of 1996,90J 
provide an eloquent demonstration of these 
problems. It is particularly telling that two 
distinguished scholars of network industries who 
are not particularly noted for deregulatory views 
87) See Venzon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinka, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (recognizing that interconnections 
disputes are "highly technical" and multifaceted "given the 
incessant, complex, and costly changing interaction of 
competitive and incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and 
interconnection obligations"); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 
U.S. 366, 429 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("The more complex the facilities, the more 
central their relation to the firm's managerial responsibilities, the 
more extensive the sharing demanded, the more likely that [the 
administrative and social costs of compulsory sharing] will 
become serious."). 
88) See MCI v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 188, 189-90 & n.238 
(D.D.C. 1982), aft' d mem. sub nom Maryland v. United States, 
460 U.S. 1001 (1983); HUBER ETAL., supra note 8, at 136-40; 
Faulhaber, supra note 86, at 81-83. 
89) SeeS. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30-32 (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1163-65; H.R. REP. NO. 102-628, at 39-
40 (1992); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 968-
70 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Donna M. Lampert, Cable Television: Does 
Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 245, 
266-67 & n.122 (1992). 
90) See U.S. Telecom Ass' n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 595 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (criticizing the FCC for its failure to develop lawful unbu-
ndling rules eight years after passage of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996). 
91) See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: 
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have suggested that access regimes have proven 
so unworkable that they should be abandoned.91l 
IV. The Lost Benefits of Vertical 
Integ ration 
Structural separation and mandating access 
limits firms' ability to engage in vertical 
integration. Although the economic literature was 
once quite hostile toward the practice, it is now 
widely recognized that vertical integration can 
give rise to substantial efficiencies.92l Some 
efficiencies are technological.93 l Others result 
from eliminating the classic problem of double 
marginalization94l or rationalizing input substitution 
when inputs can be used in variable proportions.95l 
Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other 
Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1999). 
92) See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and 
Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. REG. 171, 
189-96 (2002). For representative reviews of the efficiencies 
associated with vertical integration, see ROGER D. BLAIR & 
DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 18-23,31-42,48-52 (1983); 
FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
519-27,551-55 (3d ed., 1990); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174-81 (1988); Bruce M. 
Owen, Antitrust and Vertical Integration in "New Economy" 
Industries, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG. 363 (2011). 
93) Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, 
in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 183, 187 
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
94) For the seminal statements, see Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical 
Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950); 
Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive 
Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 
(1960). 
95) For the seminal economic analyses, see Lionel W. McKenzie, 
Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms, 61 ECON. J. 
785 (1951); Meyer Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 
NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1960); and John M. Vernon & Daniel A. 
Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 
79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971). 
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Vertical integration can also eliminate free riding 
on presale services.96l Finally, as Oliver Willi-
amson recognized in the seminal work for which 
he was recently awarded the Nobel Prize, vertical 
integration can also benefit consumers by 
eliminating the transaction costs needed to guard 
against opportunistic behavior.97l 
Although a vibrant literature has emerged 
identifying circumstances under which firms have 
substantial incentive to engage in vertical inte-
gration, the models on which these studies are 
based tend to be very stylized and depend on 
restrictive assumptionsY8l Ths in tum causes the 
results to be rather fragile and to tend to collapse 
whenever any of the models' asswnptions are 
relaxed. Just as importantly, even when vertical 
integration is feasible and profitable, the welfare 
implications of these cases are typically ambi-
guousP9l 
These theoretical models are backed by a 
substantial empirical literature confirming that that 
vertical integration tends to benefit consumers in 
the vast majority of cases. One leading study 
focuses on voice messaging services, such as 
voice mail, which were made impossible by the 
line of business restrictions imposed during the 
brealrup of AT&T and by Computer JJ.l00l These 
were introduced by local telephone companies in 
1990 and by 1994 were yielding consumer 
benefits of $1.27 billion per year. 101 l The 
telephone company first applied to provide these 
services in 19 81. But for the regulatory 
intervention delayed the introduction by five to 
seven years, which harmed consumers by at least 
$1.10 billion per year.l02) 
The broader empirical literature on vertical 
integration leads to similar conclusions. A 
comprehensive review of the empirical literature 
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on vertical integration by Francine Lafontaine and 
Margaret Slade concluded tl1at aside from a few 
isolated studies, the weight of the evidence 
indicated that "under most circumstances, profit-
maximizing vertical-integration decisions are 
efficient, not just from firms' but also from fue 
consumers' points of view," a conclusion that 
they did not have in mind when they began their 
review of the evidence and which they found 
somewhat surprising. 1 03l The survey concluded 
that "faced with a vertical arrangement, the 
burden of evidence should be placed on com-
petition authorities to demonstrate that that 
arrangement is harmful before the practice is 
attacked." 104l Moreover, the survey found "clear 
evidence that restrictions on vertical integration 
that are imposed ... on owners of retail networks 
are usually detrimental to consumers." 105) They 
tl1us called on "government agencies to reconsider 
96) For the seminal analysis, see Lester G. Telser, Why Should 
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1 960) . 
The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed this analysis in 
Continental TV Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 
(1976). 
97) See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES 
(1975). 
98) See James C. Cooper et a/., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a 
Problem of Inference. 23 INT' L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 643-
44, 646-47 (2005): Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago 
Antitrust: A Critique and Review, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
257, 278-79, 326. 
99) See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market 
Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 349-50 (1988): Michael D. 
Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. 
REV. 837, 855-56 (1 990). 
1 00) Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New 
Services in Telecommunications, 1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 13-14. 
1 01) /d. at 1 0. 
1 02) /d. at 14-15. 
1 03) Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration 
and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 
680 (2007). 
104) /d. 
105) /d. 
the validity of such restrictions." 106) 
A recent survey of the literature by leading 
vertical integration theorist and fanner FCC Chief 
Economist Michael Riordan similarly concludes, 
"A general preswnption that vertical integration is 
pro-competitive is warranted by a substantial 
economics literature identifying efficiency benefits 
of vertical integration, including empirical studies 
demonstrating positive effects of vertical integra-
tion in various industries." 107l 
Two recent reviews of the empirical literature 
on vertical contractual restraints similarly 
concluded that such practices tend to benefit con-
sumers in the vast majority of cases. For 
example, a recent survey of the empirical 
literature on vertical restraints conducted by four 
members of the Federal Trade Commission' s 
senior staff fmmd "a paucity of support for the 
proposition that vertical restraints/vertical 
integration are likely to harm conswners." 108l Only 
one study unambiguously found that vertical 
integration harmed conswners, and in that study 
the welfare losses were "miniscule." WBl On the 
other hand, "a far greater nwnber of studies found 
that the use of vertical restraints in the particular 
context studied improved welfare unambig-
106) /d. 
107) Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical 
Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 
145, 169 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008). 
1 08) Cooper, supra note 98, at 648. 
109) /d. 
11 0) /d. 
111) /d. at 658. 
112) /d. at 662. 
113) /d. at 661-62. 
114) Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts 
and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, 
in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 
107, at 392, 408, 409. 
115) /d. at 408. 
116) /d. 
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uously." 110l The survey thus concluded, "Most 
studies find evidence that vertical rest -
raints/vertical integration are pro-competitive." lll) 
The weight of the evidence thus "suggests that 
vertical restraints are likely to be benign or 
welfare enhancing," 112l which in tum provides 
empirical support for placing the burden on those 
opposing the practice.113l 
Another survey of the empirical literature on 
vertical restraints found the empirical evidence to 
be "quite striking," "surprisingly consistent," "co-
nsistent and convincing," and even "compelling."ll4l 
As a general matter, "privately imposed vertical 
restraints benefit consumers or at least do not 
harm them." In contrast, government mandates or 
prohibitions of vertical restraints "systematically 
reduce consumer welfare or at least do not 
improve it." 11 5l The authors conclude that "the 
empirical evidence suggests that in fact a relaxed 
antitrust attitude towards [vertical] restraints may 
well be warranted."ll6) 
The theoretical and empirical literature on 
vertical integration thus both strongly suggest that 
regulatory regimes mandating structural separ-
ation and prohibiting vertical integration imposes 
substantial consumer harm. The loss of these 
welfare benefits represents another way in which 
compelling access can harm conswners. 
V. The Impact on Investment 
Incentives 
The most important problem with compelling 
access to monopoly facilities is the manner in 
which it reduces incentives to invest in alternative 
network capacity that would compete with the 
monopoly facility. One reason is that, as the well 
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known "tragedy of the commons" demonstrates, 
people tend to W1derinvest in resources that are 
shared.l 17l Even more importantly, as Areeda and 
Hovenkamp note, "the right to share a monopoly 
discourages firms from developing their own 
alternative inputs." 118l As the Supreme Court has 
noted in its 2004 Trinko decision, compelling a 
telephone company to share monopoly facility 
"may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the 
rival, or both to invest in those economically 
beneficial facilities ." 119l Without access, those 
firms would have to invest in alternative sources 
of supply. By rescuing those f1m1s from having to 
W1dertake those investments, compelling access 
threatens to entrench the monopolist into place. 
This Lmderscores the extent to which mand-
ating access to a bottleneck facility represents 
surrender to the bottleneck Such an approach 
might be appropriate if entry by a competitor to 
the bottleneck were impossible. In that event, any 
dampening of incentives to invest in alternative 
network capacity would be beside the point, 
because such entry would be impossible. 12°l 
Indeed, that was the case with the breakup of 
AT & TJ2ll When that is the case, there is little 
point in trying to promote entry by new facilities 
competing directly with the bottleneck, and it is 
appropriate for policymakers to focus their 
attention on the secondary goal of promoting 
competition in complementary services. The 
situation is quite different when competitive entry 
is feasible. When that is the case, competition 
policy should focus on stimulating the investments 
needed to dissipate the monopoly. 
It is for this reason that courts applying this 
doctrine insist that the facility cannot be obtained 
from other sources or self-provisioned 
independently or when the party can compete 
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effectively without access to the facility. 122l It also 
explains why the courts have construed the 
"necessary" and "impair" requirements in the 
W1bW1clled access requirements imposed by the 
1996 Act to take into accoW1t whether it was 
available through alternative sources of supply.l23l 
When alternative sources of supply are 
available, policymakers should deny access even 
if entry by a competitive facility can only occur at 
significant cost and in the relatively long rW1.l24l 
The reason is that access means that competition 
will never emerge. In short, late is better than 
never. Approaches that dislodge bottlenecks by 
stimulating competitive entry have the advantage 
117) Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243 (1968); see also Harold Demsetz, The Private Production 
of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970). 
118) AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ~1771 b, at 195-96; 
see also id. ~l773a(10), at 239-40 ("[F]orcing a defendant 
to share an input can actually impair competition to the extent 
that it reduces the plaintiff's incentive to supply that input for 
itself."); id. ~l774c, at 266 (noting that sharing causes the 
parties seeking access "to lose some or all of the incentive to 
produce an alternative to the input on their own"). 
119) Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinka, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004). 
120) AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ~l774c, at 266. 
121) See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 537 
(D.D.C. 1987) (concluding that "[t]he exchange monopoly of 
the Regional Companies has continued because it is a natural 
monopoly"), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also 
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475-76 (2002) 
(noting that at the tirne of the breakup of AT&T, local telephone 
service was "thought to be the root of natural monopoly in the 
telecommunications industry"); Implementation of the Local 
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemak1ng, 11 F.C.C.R. 14171, 14173-
74 ~14 (1996) (noting the breakup of AT&T continued to treat 
local telephone service as a natural monopoly). 
122) See Verizon Commcn 's Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinka, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) ("[T]he indispensable 
requirement for invoking the [essential facility] doctrine is the 
unavailability of access to the 'essential facilities' .?.?.?."); 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ~l773b, at 242-48. 
123) See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-90 
(1999). 
124) AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ~l774c, at 266. 
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of having built-in exit strategies embedded within 
them. Mandated sharing of a bottleneck facility, in 
contrast. implicitly envisions that the regime of 
regulatory oversight will persist indefinitely. The 
inevitable lag in adjusting regulation also raises the 
risk that regulations, such as access, that protect 
incumbents from new entry will continue to exist 
long after the justifications for enacting the 
regulation have long disappearedJ2Sl 
As a result, courts have held that the level of 
competition that already exists between DSL and 
cable modem systems is sufficient to undercut the 
justification for requiting last-mile providers to 
make their network available to competitors.126l 
The feasibility of competitive entry is further 
underscored by recent investments in fiber to the 
home (such as Vetizon' s FiOS network) and 4G 
wireless technologies (such as WiMax and L TE). 
Although the choice between unregulated and 
regulated monopoly is sufficiently stark to justify 
125) Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 548,611-15 (1969). 
126) See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 
428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
127) See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: 
Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 
YALE J. ON REG. 55, 84-93 (2007). 
128) See Debra J. Aron & David E. Burnstein, Broadband Adoption 
in the United States: An Empirical Analysis, in DOWN TO THE 
WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Allan L. Shampine 
ed., 2003); Jan Bouckaert eta/., Access Regulation, 
Competition, and Broadband Penetration: AN International 
Study, 34 TELECOMM. POL' Y 34 (201 0); lnmaculada Cava-
Ferreruela & Antonio Albau-Mufioz, Broadband Policy 
Assessment: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis, 30 
TELECOMM. POL' Y 445 (2006); Mario Denni & Harald Gruber, 
The Diffusion of Broadband Telecommunications: The Role of 
Competition, 68 COMM. & STRATEGIES 139 (2007); Walter 
Distaso eta/., Platform Competition and Broadband Uptake: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence from the European Union, 18 
INFO. ECON. & POL' Y 87 (2006); Marcelo Grosso, Determi-
nants of Broadband Penetration in OECD Nations (Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission 2006), http:// 
networki nsight .org/verve/Jesources/G rosso M. pdf. 
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regulatory intervention, unregulated oligopoly 
performs sufficiently better than unregulated 
monopoly to tip the balance in favor of dere-
gulation.127l 
The growing body of empirical scholarship 
generally supports the conclusion that promoting 
competition by enhancing investments in new 
network capacity is more effective in promoting 
broadband adoption than mandating access to 
existing facilities. Empirical studies generally 
indicate that competition from new, facilities-
based entrants is an effective driver of broadband 
deployment and adoption.128l At the same time, 
while far from uniform, the majority of studies find 
an absence of empirical support for claims that 
mandating access promotes deployment. For 
example, studies of local telephone system have 
been largely critical of unbundling, finding it either 
to be negatively correlated with investments in 
local telephone networks 129l or finding no 
129) See, e.g., Michal Grajek & Lars-Hendrik Roler, Regulation 
and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from 
European Telecoms, 54 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2011), 
draft available at http://www.esmt.org/frn/479/ESMT -09-
004 .pdf; Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did 
Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical 
Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 173 (2005); Allan T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, 
Mandatory Unbundling, UNE -P, and the Cost of Equity: 
Does TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers?, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 389 (2003); Troy 
Quast, Did Federal Regulation Discourage Facilities-Based 
Entry into US Local Telecommunications Markets?, 32 
TELECOMM. POL'Y 572 (2008); William P. Zarakas eta!., 
Structural Stimulation of Facility Sharing: Unbundling Prices 
and Investment Strategy in Local Exchange Markets (Brattle 
Group July 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/Uploadlibrary/Upload35 
?.pdf; see also Hans Friederiszick eta/., Analyzing the 
Relationship Between Regulation and Investment in the 
Telecom Sector (European School of Management and 
Technology White Paper No. WP-1 08-01, 2008), available at 
www.esmt.org/fm/479/WP-1 08-01.pdf (concluding that 
access regulation reduces the investment incentives for new 
fixed-line entrants, has no effect on investment incentives 
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significant correlation between the two .13°l 
Empirical studies of broadband networks have 
been somewhat less critical, either fmcling that 
Lmbunclling has a small but statistically insignificant 
effect on broadband adoption13D or finding some 
indications that unbundling is having a negative 
effect on investmentJ32l 
A handful of studies do find a positive relati-
onship between unbundling and investment.133l 
These studies have been critiqued for anomalies 
for incumbents or mobile operators). For articles drawing the 
related conclusion that setting access prices too low deters 
investment, see Rober! W. Crandall et a/., Do Unbundling 
Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment?, 4 
TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 14 (June 7, 2004), 
http: I /www .bepress.com/beieap/topics/vo14/iss1 /art14/; 
Agustin J. Ros & Karl McDermott, Are Residential Local 
Exchange Prices Too Low?, in EXPANDING COMPETITION IN 
REGULATED INDUSTRIES 149 (Michael A. Crew ed., 2000); 
James Zolnierek eta/., An Empirical Examination of Entry 
Patterns in Local Telephone Markets, 19 J. REG. ECON. 143 
(2001); James Eisner & Dale E. Lehman, Regulatory Behavior 
and Competitive Entry (2001) (unpublished manuscript 
presented at the 14th Annual Western Conference, Center for 
Research in Regulated Industries), http: //www.aestudies. 
com/library/elpaper.pdf; Leonard Waverman eta/., Access 
Regulation and Infrastructure Investment in the Tele-
communications Sector: An Empirical Investigation (LECG 
Sept. 2007), available at http://www.etno.be/portals/ 
34/etno%20documents/lecg_final%20report.pdf. 
130) See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett & Coleman Bazelon, Regulated 
Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks: A Stepping 
Stone to Facilities-Based Competition? 16_19 (Oct. 4, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://mason.gmu.edu 
HhazletVpubs/Stepping%20Stone%20TPRC.1 0.04.05%20.pdf. 
131) See Cava-Ferreruela & Albau-Muiioz, supra note 128, at 
455: Sangwon Lee , Broadband Deployment in the United 
States: Examining the Impacts of Platform Competition, 8 
I NT' L J. ON MEDIA MGMT. 173, 179 (2006); Scott Wallsten 
& Stephanie Hausladen, Net Neutrality, Unbundling, and the 
Effects on International Investment in Next-Generation 
Networks, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 90 (2009); ; Johannes 
M. Bauer eta/., Effects of National Policy on the Diffusion of 
Broadband in OECD Countries, 15 (Jan. 25, 2005) (unpu-
blished manuscript) , available at http: //bear.warrington. 
ufl. edu/centers/purc/DOCS/PRESENT A TIONS/events/0205%2 
OLBS/paper/Bauer-Kim-Wildman-UFL -2005.pdf; Glen 
Boyle eta/., Catching Up in Broadband Regressions: Does 
Local Loop Unbundling Really Lead to Material Increases in 
OECD Broadband Uptake? (New Zealand Institute for the 
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in their specifications (both in terms of anomalous 
results and important variables omitted) and for 
assuming that unbundling policies are exogenous 
instead of entertaining the possibility that 
regulators impose unbundling requirements in 
response to investments by incumbents.134l In 
addition, studies comparing the impact of inter-
platform competition and unbundling uniformly 
fmd the former to be more important.135l 
A few caveats are in order. Almost all of the 
Study of Competition and Regulation Working Paper , July 
2008), available at ht tp://www. iscr.org.nz/f 410 ,11598/ 
11598_LLUBroadband01 cJev_300708.pdf .. 
132) Bouckaert et a/., supra note 128, at 669, 671; Denni & 
Gruber, supra note 128, at 151, 153, 155; Bronwyn Howell, 
Infrastructure Regulation and the Demand for Broadband 
Services: Evidence from OECD Countries, 47 COMM. & 
STRATEGIES 33, 39 (2002); Scott Wallsten & Stephanie 
Hausladen, Net Neutrality, Unbundling, and Their Effects on 
International Investment in Next-Generation Networks, 8 
REV. NETWORK ECON. 90 (2009); Scott Wallsten, Whence 
Competition in Network Industries? Broadband and 
Unbundling Regulations in OECD Countries (Dec. 2007), 
available at http ://www. techpolicyinstitute .org/files/s8.pdf; 
see also Sangwon Lee & Seonmi Lee, An Empirical Study of 
Broadband Diffusion and Bandwidth Capacity in OECD 
Countries, 2 COMM. & CONVERGENCE REV. 36, 46 (2010) 
(finding local loop unbundling to be negatively correlated with 
broadband diffusion at a statistically insignificant level). 
133) See Martha Garcia-Murillo, International Broadband 
Deployment: The Impacts of Unbundling, 57 COMM. & 
STRATEGIES 83, 96, 102 (2005); Sangwon Lee & Justin S. 
Brown, Examining Broadband Adoption Factors: An Empirical 
Analysis Between Countries, 10 INFO: J. POL' Y, REG. , & 
STRATEGY FOR TELECOMM ., INFO. & MEDIA 25, 34-35 
(2008); Grosso, supra note 128, at 21. 
134) See Declaration of Robert W. Crandall, Evert M. Ehrlich and 
Jeffrey A. Eisenach Regarding the Berkman Center Study 
(NBP Public Notice 13), at 28-31, International Comparison 
and Consumer Survey Requirements in the Broadband Data 
Improvement Act, 25 F .C.C.R. 11963 (201 0) (GN Docket No. 
09-47). Notably, one study applied bivariate correlations to 
find that competition and unbundling are positively correlated 
with broadband diffusion, but found that statistical significance 
disappeared in two of three multivariate regression speci-
fications. See Garcia- Murillo, supra note 133, at 102. 
135) See Bouckaert eta/., supra note 128, at 669; Denni & Gruber, 
supra note 128, at 155: Distaso et al. , supra note 128, at 
t 02-03; Garcia-Murillo, supra note 133, at 101 , 1 02; Howell, 
supra note 132, at 44; Lee, supra note 131 , at 179. 
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empirical analyses are not based on time series 
data, which means that they necessarily fail to 
control for technology' s inherent tendency to 
diffuse over time.136l In addition, many of these 
studies focus on adoption rather than inve-
stment.137l That said, to the extent that the 
empirical record favors one side of the debate or 
the other, it tends to favor promoting competition 
through encouraging investment in new networks 
rather than by mandating access to existing 
networks. As a recent survey of the empirical 
literature concluded, "although few empirical 
findings support the non-negative effect of 
access regulation on investment, most of the 
evidence shows that local loop unbundling based 
on forward-looking cost methodology disc-
ourages both ILECs and CLECs from investing in 
networks." 138l 
By now, the implications for broadband policy 
should be manifest. The decision whether to 
mandate access should tum not on its impact on 
markets for complementary services, but rather 
on its effect on stimulating additional competition 
in the last mile. If access were mandated, any 
would-be last-mile entrant would realize that 
even if it were successful, it would be forced to 
make its platform available to all content and 
application providers under rates that would limit it 
to ordinary returns. In addition, the would-be 
136) See Carlo Cambini & Yanyan Jiang, Broadband Investment 
and Regulation: A Literature Review, 33 TELECOMM. POL' Y 
559, 569, 571 (2009); Crandall et at., supra note 134, at 30. 
137) See Cambini & Jiang, supra note 136, at 569; Lee & Brown, 
supra note 133, at 34. 
138) Cambini & Jiang, supra note 136, at 569; accord id. at 571 
(concluding that although the "[e]vidence in empirical 
findings exhibits a certain disunity," "[t]he majority [of the 
studies] concludes that local loop unbundling based on 
forward-looking cost methodology discourage both ILECs 
and CLECs from investing in networks"). 
24 
builder would not find a group of content and 
applications providers clamoring for additional 
capacity, since mandating access to the existing 
platform would rescue them from having to invest 
in alternative distribution arrangements. 
In the process, mandating access to the 
monopoly facility risks dampening incentives to 
invest in new last-mile technologies to the extent 
that it cements the existing last-mile oligopoly 
into place. Although such a policy might be 
justifiable if entry by alternative network capacity 
were impossible, it is indefensible when L TE, 
WiMax, and other technologies are actively 
searching for capital to support their deployment 
and when what represents the state of the art in 
transmission is undergoing rapid technological 
change. At best, the inevitable lag in enacting new 
regulations \Viii cause economic losses. At worst, 
by destroying incentives to build new techno-
logies, regulation might cement the market 
concentration that represents the central focus of 
broadband policy into place. Under these 
circumstances, mandating network neutrality 
would appear to pose a serious threat to dynamic 
efficiency. 
VI. Conclusion 
The decision whether to mandate access to 
telecommunications networks thus confronts 
policymakers with a choice between two regula-
tory paradigms, one that focuses on breal<ing 
down the monopoly by stimulating competitive 
entry and another that surrenders to the mono-
poly and simply seeks to allocate the monopoly 
loop. The theoretical and empirical literature both 
suggest that consumers would benefit more if 
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policymakers would follow the first course by 
refusing to mandate access. 
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